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UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL ConE - MoTOR VEHICLES - FILING REQUIRED To
PERFECT SECURITY INTERESTS-In 1958 Kentucky enacted the Uniform
Commercial Code1 providing for the perfection of security interests in
chattels by filing a financing statement,2 and a motor vehicle Certificate of

1 KY. REv. STAT. ch. 355 (Supp. 1960) • Kentucky adopted the UCC in 1958 to become
effective on July 1, 1960. This two-year period is usually provided by states adopting
the Code to allow practitioners to become acquainted with its provisions.
2 KY. R.Ev. STAT. § 355.9-302 (1) (Supp. 1960) • The financing statement replaces the
usual provisions for the recording of chattel mortgages, conditional sales contracts,
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Title Act requiring liens to be noted on the registration certificate covering the vehicle. 3 The Code excludes from its filing provisions security
interests in property subject to a Certificate of Title Act4 and provides that
such interests can be perfected only by compliance with the requirements
of the title act. 5 However, unlike the typical Certificate of Title Act, the
Kentucky title act does not provide that the notation of the lien on the
registration certificate is to be the exclusive method of perfecting security
interests. 6 In an action for declaratory judgment, the trial court held
that, the exemption provision notwithstanding, perfection is to be accomplished only by standard Code filing of a financing statement, although
notation of liens on the registration certificate is also mandatory. On
appeal, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. 7 The legislature intended that
motor vehicle security interests be perfected by standard Code procedures.
Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Queenan, 344 S.W.2d 383 (Ky. 1961).
The Code's exemption provision was originally adopted by the Commissioners because of the inconsistency between standard Code filing and
the typical Certificate of Title Act provision for notation as the exclusive
factor's liens, trust receipts and similar security devices. See generally Kripke, Kentucky
Modernizes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 KY. L.J. 369 (1960).
3 KY. REv. STAT. § 186.195 (1960): "(1) Whenever the owner of a motor vehicle,
properly registered in this state, executes a lien thereon, he shall deliver the registration
receipt to the secured party. The secured party shall, within ten days thereafter, present
such receipt, together with the lien instrument and proper fees, to the county clerk
of the county in which the motor vehicle is registered for recording. (2) The county
clerk shall, within five days, mail the registration receipt with the lien recorded thereon
to the owner, and shall also record the lien on the copy of the registration receipt on
file in the county clerk's office •••."
4 KY. REv. STAT. § 355.9-302(3) (Supp. 1960): " ••. (3) the filing provisions of
this article do not apply to a security interest in property subject to a statute . • •
(b) of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a
certificate of title of, such security interests in such property."
5 KY. REv. STAT. § 355.9-302 (4) (Supp. 1960): "A security interest in property covered
by a statute described in subsection (3) can be perfected only by registration or filing
under that statute or by indication of the security interest on a certificate of title or a
duplicate thereof by a public official." For a complete discussion of the Code exemption
provisions for motor vehicle security interests, see generally Comment, 47 CALIF. L. REv.
543 (1959); Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 995 (1961).
6 The Certificate of Title Acts of twenty-two states specifically provide that notation
and compliance with the act are the exclusive methods of perfecting security interests
in motor vehicles. See notes 15 &: 18 infra. Section 25 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Certificate of Title c- Anti-Theft Act likewise provides that notation is the exclusive
method of perfecting motor vehicle security interests. As of this date only Connecticut
and Illinois have enacted § 25. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190 (1958) ; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 95½, § 3-207 (Smith-Hurd 1958). The Kentucky act also differs markedly from the
typical title act in that it does not provide for a separate certificate of title document,
but rather makes use of the registration certificate issued by all states.
7 Judge Montgomery dissented on other issues involved in the case but did not
express an opinion on the issue of perfection of security interests in motor vehicles, nor
on the question of the effect of the notation statute.
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method of perfecting an interest.8 However, since the Kentucky title act
does not provide that perfection is to be accomplished by notation, it is
compatible with standard Code filing. Furthermore, three non-Code
statutes enacted at the same time as the Code indicate a legislative intention that financing statements should be used in connection with motor
vehicle security interests.9 The court was faced, therefore, with the dilemma
of either giving effect to the provision exempting motor vehicle security
interests from standard Code filing, which would be inconsistent with the
three non-Code statutes implying the use of financing statements, or finding
standard Code filing applicable to motor vehicle security interests, thereby
ignoring the plain meaning of the exemption provision. By electing the
second alternative the court may have encroached upon the legislature's
province. However, the evidence in the other statutes of legislative inten•
tion to use financing statements, together with the compatibility of the
non-exclusive notation statute with standard Code filing, justify the result
reached. In determining the intent of the legislature it is probably more
reasonable to rely upon the three non-Code statutes than upon the exemption provision which may have been automatically adopted by the legislature when enacting the entire Code in its original form.
Since no specific penalty was provided for non-compliance with the
notation statute, the court concluded that the legislature intended that the
county clerk should refuse to record the financing statement in the absence
of compliance.10 The opinion also states that it is the filing of the financing statement alone which perfects the interest, regardless of the duties
of the parties and county clerks under the notation statute.11 However,
s See Comment, 70 YALE L.J. 995, 999 (1961).
9 KY. REV. STAT. § 382.740 (Supp. 1960) provides that the "lien instrument" mentioned in the notation statute [K.Y. R.Ev. STAT. § 186.195 (Supp. 1960)] shall be filed
"in the same manner as financing statements are required to be filed by [the Uniform
Commercial Code]." Although admitting that it is unclear, the court determined that
a financing statement is a "lien instrument" within the intendment of the notation
statute. The result is that a financing statement must be presented to the county clerk
along with the registration certificate and that the former is to be filed as required under
standard Code filing. KY. REv. STAT. § 382.770 (Supp. 1960) provides that if the
collateral is an automobile or motor truck in the hands of a consumer the financing
statement is to include specified additional information. The inference here is that a
financing statement is required for motor vehicles. The court also relied upon the
notation statute itself, which recognizes that a security interest may be recorded in a
county other than the one in which it is registered. KY. REv. STAT. § 186.195 (3)
(Supp. 1960) •
10 The court held specifically that the notation statute was not applicable to registered
motor vehicles in a dealer's inventory. The Code in effect provides for a floating lien
whereby an inventory vehicle is automatically freed of a perfected security interest as it
goes into the hands of a buyer in the ordinary course of business. KY. REv. STAT.
§ 355.9-307 (Supp. 1960) . The court felt that the statute was incompatible with the
floating lien system.
11 Principal case at 387.
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if perfection is to be accomplished by filing, and if filing can be accomplished only by compliance with the requirements of the notation statute,
it follows that notation also is a prerequisite of perfecting. The discrepancy
between the language of the opinion and the logical result of requiring the
clerk to refuse to record may present ambiguity as to whether or not a
security interest has been perfected. For instance, the county clerk might
inadvertently record a financing statement without the lien's having been
noted on the registration certificate. Relying on the notation requirement,
a court could logically hold that the interest was not perfected. Alternatively, applying the suggestion of the court in the principal case, it could
hold that the filing of the financing statement alone perfected the interest.
In addition, by requiring notation as well as filing of a financing statement, the decision creates a system of double filing. There is no practical
justification for a dual method of giving notice, and legal writers have
expressed their disapproval of such a system.12 The owner of the security
interest must bear a greater recording expense, and, in view of the uncertainty shown above, the additional requirement of notation bestows no
benefit on the general public since even where the registration certificate
does not indicate a lien a search must nevertheless be made for a financing
statement covering the chattel in order to be certain that the lienholder
has not simply failed to comply with the notation statute. Rather than
effecting a system of dual filing with ambiguity concerning the requisites
of perfecting an interest, perhaps the court should have waited for the
legislature either to provide a penalty for failing to comply with the notation statute, or to amend it to make it an exclusive type of title act.13
The problem of reconciling the Code's exemption provision with the
non-exclusive type Certificate of Title Act is not confined to Kentucky.
Of the twelve other states which have adopted the Code,14 only six have
the exclusive-type Certificate of Title Acts for which the exemption provision was designed.lli Three do not have title acts and therefore require
the use of standard Code filing. 16 However, three Code states have the nonexclusive type of statute and therefore face the problem which confronted
Kentucky.17 Among the thirty-seven states which have not adopted the
12 See Kripke, supra note 2; Comment, 54 MICH. L. REv. 680 (1956) •
13 If the court left the notation statute without a penalty the statute would be
ineffective. In view of the holding of the principal case the ideal solution for Kentucky
would be to amend the notation statute to the usual exclusive form.
14 Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.
15 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-161 (1957); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-190 (1958); !LL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 95½, § 3-207 (Smith-Hurd 1958); N.M. STAT• .ANN. § 64-5-2 (1960); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4505.lll (Page 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 203 (1960).
16 Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island.
17 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 23.ll (1950) provides that notation of liens be made
only on the application form for a certificate of title. The court in King-Godfrey, Inc.
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Code, twelve have the non-exclusive type of Certificate of Title Act.18 In
these, as well as in the three Code states with non-exclusive title acts,
amendments are needed to provide smooth integration with the Code and
to avoid litigation and double filing.
David Finkelman, S.Ed.

v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, II P .2d 935 (1932) held that the notation on the application
form did not impart notice and that the chattel mortgage filing provisions controlled.
The Oregon statute, like Oklahoma's, provides only that liens be noted on the application. ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 481.110 (1959) . Thus standard Code filing should control.
The Wyoming title act provides for notation on the certificate, but like Kentucky does
not provide that such notation perfects the security interest. ·wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-36
(1957).
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2333 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2501 (Supp. 1961);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-135 (Supp. 1959) ; Mn. ANN. ConE art. 66½, § 28 (1957);
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 257.222, .238 (a) (Supp. 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:10-11 (c)
(1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-57 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-05-09 (1960); WASH. REv.
ConE § 46.12.170 (1953); W. VA. ConE ANN. § 1721 (130) (Supp. 1960); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 342.10 (I) (b) (1958). The Texas Certificate of Title Act is also of the non•e.'Cclusive
type. TEX. PEN. ConE ANN. art. 1436-1 (1953). However, it has been held to supersede
the regular chattel mortgage recording provisions and would presumably be held to
replace standard Code filing under the exemption provision if Texas were to adopt
the Code. Higgins v. Robertson, 210 S.W.2d 250 (!'ex. Civ. App. 1948). Sixteen
non-Code states have the exclusive type title act for which the exemption provision was
designed: A.LAsKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 50-6-10 (6) (Supp. 1958); Aroz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.
§ 28-325 (E) (1956); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 6303; COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-19 (Supp.
1960) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 49-414 (1948) ; IOWA CODE
§ 321.50 (1958) ; LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 32:710 (Supp. 1960) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.480
(1952); MONT. R.Ev. CODES ANN. § 53-110 (1954); NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-110 (1960);
NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 482.450 (Supp. 1960) ; S.D. ConE § 44.0203 (Supp. 1960) ; TENN. ConE
ANN. § 59-326 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1-87 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-71
(1958) • The remaining nine non-Code states do not have Certificate of Title Acts and
would therefore require the use of standard Code filing.

